Less than two months before Iran elects its next president, the country faces a set of political and economic challenges. The outcome of the elections will have a significant impact at home and will set the tone for Iran’s international policy in the next four years. While President Rouhani’s re-election is a likely prospect, a victory for the country’s hard-liners cannot be ruled out.

May 19 is set to be a decisive date as Iranians head to the polls to elect their next president. The election will be closely watched by investors and the international community, and is likely to have deep repercussions at home and abroad. More than one year after the landmark signature of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the nuclear deal, which opened the country to international investments, the May elections are widely seen as a test of Hassan Rouhani’s reformist agenda.

Rouhani is seeking re-election but his campaign faces challenges from Iran’s hardliners (or principlists) and senior clerics. Donald Trump’s criticism of the nuclear deal during the U.S presidential campaign has also cast a shadow over the future of U.S-Iranian relations and the nuclear agreement.

Iran faces a combination of political and economic risks

The relaxation of economic sanctions following the signature of the nuclear deal has opened up and provided a boost to the Iranian economy, resulting in more foreign investments and an increase in exports and oil revenues. In December, Rouhani’s government announced an ambitious new budget plan of $100billion in a bid to stimulate growth. The Iranian population has nonetheless seen little improvement in its living standards.

Unemployment rates went up in 2016 and job creation remains one of the key economic challenges for the months ahead. International investors are still cautious to launch and expand operations in the country as a result of wider regional instability and security concerns, lack of transparency and remaining U.S sanctions. The latest IMF report on Iran underlined the positive effect of the lifting of sanctions on economic growth while highlighting Iran’s structural problems. Growth was mainly driven by the oil sector in 2016 and has not reverberated through other business sectors.  

Domestic and international politics is another risk factor. Iran has stepped up its involvement in the Syrian conflict alongside Russia and Turkey. The country’s growing involvement in Syria and ongoing support for Shia militias in the region continues to fuel distrust among the international community regarding Iran’s intentions and reliability as a partner.

The election of Donald Trump in the U.S has opened a period of uncertainty for Iran’s nuclear deal and the future of U.S-Iranian relations. The American president’s tough approach to Iran could encourage investors to put their projects on hold in the upcoming months. Additionally, the tensions between reformists and hardliners, and the divergent views of Iran’s leadership about the future of the country could further complicate the picture and act as a deterrent for investors.

The prospects for Rouhani’s re-election

Since 1981, every Iranian president has secured a second term in power. Despite the diplomatic success of the nuclear deal, several factors could affect Rouhani’s ability to be re-elected. Rouhani has staked his re-election on the economic benefits brought by sanctions relief. As the lifting of sanctions fails to deliver the expected results for the people, Rouhani’s government faces growing criticism from the opposition. Earlier this month, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticised the government for its economic record, stating that “people should feel improvements regarding creation of jobs and manufacturing.”

During his first term in office, Rouhani relied on a diverse and fragile coalition of conservatives, reformists and moderates. The difficulties of keeping the coalition together have weakened his position in Iranian politics and could affect his ability to secure re-election.

The election of Donald Trump in the U.S has defied predictions and emboldened Iran’s hard-liners. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, particularly powerful under the Ahmadinejad presidency, is looking to regain the influence it has lost under Rouhani’s presidency. While no candidate has yet emerged among the hard-liners, it is clear that Rouhani will face strong opposition from the selected candidate.

Rouhani’s prospects are also affected by the battle between reformists and hard-liners for the succession of Ali Khamenei. Khamenei’s health has prompted speculations about potential successors and their visions for Iran’s international policy as the Revolutionary Guards and the country’s leading clerics attempt to secure the selection of an anti-reformist candidate.

The death of former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in January dealt a blow to the reformist camp. Rajsanjani was not only a staunch supporter of the nuclear deal and a key ally for Rouhani but also a member of the Assembly of Experts, the council tasked with choosing Khamenei’s successor.

The impact of the high-stakes election

In the context of heightened tensions between Iran and the American administration, the outcome of the elections is expected to have a deep impact on Iran’s prospects in the next four years. The results will set the tone for Iran’s relations with the West and will determine whether Iran will pursue its policy of economic liberalisation.

Rouhani’s re-election would increase the chances of maintaining the nuclear deal in place despite uncertainties on the stance the new U.S administration will adopt. A Rouhani victory would also send a signal to investors about Iran’s commitment to further opening its economy to foreign investments.

While polls suggest that the incumbent president is likely to be re-elected, the victory of a hard-line candidate cannot be ruled out entirely. This scenario would cast serious doubt over the future of the nuclear deal by adding to the risks of violations on both sides, while offsetting the path of economic liberalisation chosen by Rouhani since 2013.

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The killing of Lipolelo Thabane, ex-wife of Prime Minister Thomas Thabane on June 14th highlights the country’s instability, coming only two days before the inauguration of Prime Minister Thabane. While it remains unclear who the perpetrators are, there are suspicions that the death was politically motivated. The divisive nature of Lesotho’s politics has seen PM Thabane amass a large collection of rivals, all of whom could have orchestrated the incident in order to send a message.

PM Thabane’s estranged wife filed for divorce in 2012, yet was awarded all the perks and privileges of the first lady in a court decision in 2015. This came about despite Thabane having remarried, with his new wife joining him on his return from exile in February as well as on the recent campaign trail. While PM Thabane’s opponents in the outgoing government and military may be behind the murder, Lipolelo Thabane may have also been killed by allies of the Prime Minister in order to tie up any loose ends. An additional theory is that the incident was a random murder, yet the victim and timing raises considerable suspicions. Whatever the reason, the event underlines the tensions in the country, and presents a jumping off point for an examination of the risks facing Lesotho.

Lesotho’s election see-saw

The recent June election constitutes the third in five years, as the seven party coalition of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili lost a vote of confidence in March. Mosisili and Thabane are long standing political rivals. Mosisili ruled the country from 1998 until 2012, when he lost power to Thabane and his All Basotho Convention (ABC). In 2014, Thabane faced a failed coup and fled the country, leading to change of government in 2015 which returned Mosisili to power.

Despite defeating Mosisili in the most recent election, Thabane’s ABC only won 48 of the 80 directly contested seats. Consequently, Lesotho is in store for yet another coalition government as the ABC needs to secure enough partners to control 61 of the 120 total seats to attain a majority. The outgoing regime is not going to making things any easier. Concerns of influence peddling have arisen following the promotion of 32 officers only days before the election: an official memo was released the day after the vote. Critics of Mosisili claim that this was a political move to maintain influence after he leaves office. Mosisili’s detractors also point to the appointment of his son to the influential Lesotho Highlands Water Commission. Said organization is leading Lesotho’s 30 year plan to establish near total domestic electricity generation plus water and electricity exports to South Africa – both highly lucrative ventures: the $2 billion second phase is currently underway.

Former Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili

The killing of Lipolelo Thabane tarnishes the UN’s congratulations on a peaceful election sent to Lesotho on June 8th. Since the incident, neighbouring South Africa has called for calm in the country. Lesotho is fully surrounded by South Africa, and any instability in the small kingdom would effectively become an internal problem for South Africa as well, especially if a humanitarian exodus and / or conflict emerges. The fact that Lesotho is divided between the largely pro-Thabane capital and north and pro-Mosisili south adds another destabilizing dimension to the mix.

Consequently, South Africa has made it clear that it will not tolerate any threats to the transition of power and Lesotho’s stability. International relations and cooperation minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane stated that “not in any corner of our [Southern African Development Community] not in any corner of our continent will we ever tolerate a military coup […] So on the coup thing, I think it is clear as [daylight] we will not allow it to happen, not in our backyard. That’s not a threat; it’s just the way it is.” South Africa’s deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa is to attend Thabane’s inauguration on June 16th, accompanied by a substantial security detail, whose presence is in part to ensure that the event runs smoothly. Mosisili expressed his distrust of Ramaphosa in 2015, due to his ties with outgoing deputy prime minister Mothetjoa Metsing, highlighting the kinds of internal divisions within the former regime that saw the coalition fall apart.

The elephant in the room: Lesotho’s military

The failed 2014 coup underlines South Africa’s concerns about the role of the military in Lesotho. The Lesotho Defence Force maintains that the storming of buildings in the capital Maseru in 2014 was not a coup, but rather a pre-emptive strike against the police who the military claim were creating a rival armed faction. Thabane points to the threat on this life and his flight to South Africa as evidence to the contrary. In any case, either scenario hardly instills confidence. Moreover, the entire incident was triggered by the firing of Lt. Gen. Tlali Kamoli, whose replacement Maaparankoe Mahao was killed following Thabane’s flight to South Africa. A month prior to Mahao’s death, Thabane’s friend and ABC founder Thabiso Tsosane was also gunned down by unknown assailants.

The tense state of affairs is made painfully clear by Thabane’s refusal to accept a military security detail following his election as prime minister. It is standard procedure for the prime minister-elect to be appointed a military escort, yet Thabane has opted for his own private security detachment. This, combined with the fact that Thabane has not cancelled the long-term lease on his residence in South Africa, demonstrates his continued distrust of the military.

Prime Minister Thomas Thabane (left) and Mothetjoa Metsing (right)

Mothetjoa Metsing has done little to assuage these concerns. Speaking to supporters on election day, Metsing stated the following: “Let me tell you that is is because of the members of this country’s army who put their necks on the block that we ended up taking power, and if today Thabane attains power, it is clear that some of them would be in danger.”

In the light of such statements, it is unsurprising that Thabane remains uncomfortable being guarded by members of a military he maintains tried to kill him in 2014. Moreover, there are widespread rumours in Maseru that the military officers assigned to guard Thabane post-election were part of a group formerly protecting and working with Metsing, who has a long-standing rivalry with Thabane. The presence of armed soldiers at many polling stations on election also raised concerns about voter intimidation, especially since the Mosisili government had pledged to restrict the army to barracks on election day.

For his part, Thabane has floated the idea of altering Lesotho’s security framework, looking to countries such as Costa Rica which have transitioned to alternate defence arrangements. “When we win [the election], we will gradually look at examples in the world where there are armed people who are not a classical army so that jobs would be kept and nobody would suffer and new recruits will undergo a less classical military training,” notes Thabane in a recent interview. Such a dramatic policy change would certainly raise the hackles of Thabane’s detractors in the military as well as outgoing PM Mosisili. The degree to which such a proposal stems from Thabane’s personal history with the military or from loftier aspirations remains uncertain. Nevertheless, Lesotho’s successive coups since independence point to a concrete underlying problem.

As things stand, Thabane’s need for coalition partners limits his political capital and puts into question his reform plans for the military. 2017 has the potential to either begin a period of reform or simply mark another year of deadlocked politics: don’t cancel that lease just yet.

Under the Radar uncovers political risk events around the world overlooked by mainstream media. By detecting hidden risks, we keep you ahead of the pack and ready for new opportunities.

Under the Radar is written by Senior Analyst Jeremy Luedi.

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The Malaysian general election campaigning season has been shaken up by the return of Mahathir Mohamad, a former prime minister who intends to challenge the party he once led. His return may be a key factor in uniting the opposition and reviving allegations of corruption against the current prime minister.

Political parties are mobilizing in preparation for general elections which must be held by August 2018. The main coalitions are Barisan Nasional, which has won every election since it was founded in 1973, and Pakatan Haraban, which has been steadily gaining vote share over the past decade. The election is significant because of two factors: the return of Mahathir Mohamad, a former prime minister who has joined the opposition coalition, and the 1MDB scandal which continues to dog the current prime minister Najib Razak. Together these two factors may be able to lead the opposition to an unprecedented victory.

A twisted web

Mahathir was Malaysia’s longest serving prime minister, serving 22 years between 1981 and 2003. Even after his retirement he remained a vocal critic of his successors. Now at age 92 he has come out of retirement to join the opposition coalition alongside the former deputy prime minister he had previously jailed, Anwar Ibrahim, with the aim of defeating the party he once led.

Anwar, the founder of the opposition party, is currently in jail on charges of sodomy similar to, but separate from, those leveled against him by Mahathir. Yet despite their troubled past Anwar has embraced Mahathir’s return to the fray. The reason is that Mahathir could be a unifying figure for the fragmented opposition coalition and an opportunity to win over previously inaccessible rural constituencies. After all, the opposition coalition is currently without a leader, since Anwar can hardly govern from jail and would require a full royal pardon to take part in the upcoming election.

The opposition’s situation has been bolstered by Najib’s association with the 1MDB scandal. American investigators have linked money taken from 1MDB, a government owned development firm, to Najib’s own accounts as well as those of his friends and associates. Najib has dismissed these allegations as politically motivated, though it is not clear what the ulterior motive would be. In 2015 it was unclear if Najib would survive the scandal, but having managed to retain his position as Prime Minister he will now have to face voters.

Corruption and the economy

This election could be a defining moment for Malaysian politics which have been plagued with corruption scandals for decades including the Felda Global Ventures scandal (2017), the 1MDB scandal (2015), the National Feedlot scandal (2012) and the Port Klang Free Trade Zone scandal (2008). Strikingly, no one has been held accountable for the Port Klang scandal or for the 1MDB scandal.

The most recent scandals, however, are occurring at a time when corruption is the mot du jour – from Brazil to Pakistan populations are becoming increasingly frustrated with systemic cronyism, corruption and inequality. The ability for information to be shared and spread online means that groups, and youth in particular, can be mobilized to hold their leaders accountable. In the past strong economic growth, limited information sharing capacity, and a weaker press may have suppressed Malaysian voter concerns about corruption. Better information sharing capacity combined with the opposition’s attempt to weaponize corruption allegations may turn the tide against entrenched groups.

A survey conducted by Transparency International found that 59% of Malaysians felt that corruption had increased in the past year and 62% felt that the government was doing a poor job of fighting corruption. The upcoming election may reveal how these sentiments translate into votes.

A long time coming

The current ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional, has never lost an election since it was founded in 1973 and Malaysia’s top position features an unbroken line of prime ministers from the UMNO, the coalition’s main party.

Their continued control, however, is no longer so certain. Barisan Nasional has gradually lost vote share over the past several elections. In 2004 they won a solid 63.8% of the vote and 51.4% in 2008. In 2013 they won only 47.4% of the popular vote but maintained control of parliament which led to accusations of gerrymandering.

A victory for Pakatan Haraban would be a sign of disillusionment with the status quo among voters. Perceptions of economic well being and representation, not just corruption, will define voter outlooks. If the Malaysian economy weakens voters may turn to Pakatan Haraban. Reforming entrenched interests and cracking down on corruption will continue to be a challenge regardless of who wins the election.

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Despite the political and economical instability facing South America, the small nation of Paraguay is experiencing growth.

This upturn is due to a record soy harvest alongside a number of infrastructure projects supporting predictions of the country’s economy to grow by more than 4.2 percent this year.

The crops

The most important part of the Paraguayan economy is its agricultural sector that is the world’s fourth-largest soy exporter. The 2016/17 soy crop yield is estimated to be more than 10 million tonnes and expectant to be worth $3 billion. These figures are very important to an economy that lacks in mineral resources while the nation has recently been affected by weather conditions that have destroyed 430,000 hectares of high-protein wheat sown this year.

The Minister of Finance, Santiago Peña, affirmed “What’s interesting about this [soy] harvest is the impact that it has on the whole supply chain and on other sectors. When we add up commerce, transportation and the financial sector, it’s going to be a very strong year.”

Paraguay has enjoyed an agricultural boom with the production of grain from 2 million metric tons in 1991 to an expected 17 million tons a year. It has been a process supported by investment in its agricultural sector.

“We have managed to greatly increase agricultural production without occupying much more land. Production grew to over seven fold in the last twenty-six years, while the farmed area only doubled,” as stated by Hector Cristaldo, President of the Paraguayan Farmers Association.

The country is experiencing growth, as in May, economic activity grew nearly 5 percent year-on-year. A result prolonged by the support of greater investment into its infrastructure since the centre-right President, Horacio Cartes, won the election in April 2013. Paraguay in that same year joined the international bond markets but will not return to these markets this year since raising $500 million in debt.

Public dismay

Growing dismay amongst its agricultural communities has been reported by a proposed 15 percent export tax on corn, soy and wheat exports that have acted as a catalyst for mass protests. The Paraguayan government has argued that the agricultural sector contributes too little to the country when compared to other sectors.

Approximately, 2.6 million people live in rural zones and account for 30 percent of the population. While 2.6 percent of landowners, the small elite, hold 85.5 percent of Paraguay’s lands, of whom the state has been known to act in favour of. The government’s tax proposal would affect the incomes of farming populations, fearing they would become of the nation’s growing poverty epidemic while the proposal could pressurise the risks of pushing Paraguay’s agricultural boom into jeopardy. Alongside this, the government has vetoed a decision in August, after promising 2 days before that to subsidize small and medium farmers for the refinancing of agricultural debts, enraging farmers even further.

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Further rising tensions

With over 40 percent of its 6.8 million population living in poverty, Paraguay is still considered one of Latin America’s poorest countries. While growth is expected, the country is plagued with corruption and political unrest that threatens Paraguay’s fragile democracy.

Earlier this year between March and April, further protests were experienced when demonstrators set fire to Paraguay’s Congress building in response to President Horacio Cartes attempts to change a constitutional amendment that would enable Cartes to run for a re-election. The disruption ended with the Chamber of Deputies of Paraguay rejecting the constitutional amendment proposal. The strong public response against the government is a reflection of the nation’s murky past when it was under rulership by dictator Alfredo Stroessner between 1954-1989.

But despite the recent public outcry against the current President, results of next years April 2018 elections look like Paraguay will follow Latin America’s recent populist trend and continue with the conservative Colorado party. Paraguay’s Minister of Finance, Santiago Peña, will run for office as leader of the Colorado party that has ruled Paraguay for a combined 61 years, only losing recently in 2008 to the centre-left Christian Democratic Party led by the Fernando Lugo. The Colorado party is believed to win the next election as Peña has indicated he will have similar policies to Cartes.  

The effect

While the President’s attempt at altering the amendment to run for president has been negated, other proposals such as the tax on the agriculture sector brings unnecessary uncertainty amongst Paraguay’s already dismayed farming population. This will also present a risk towards disturbing the country’s booming agricultural sector.

With the upcoming Presidential elections, the President’s current party believes an election victory is within their reach, again. But while the party continues to implement controversial policies, they risks disturbing Paraguay’s population, which could ultimately end in a surprising election result and disrupt the much needed economic growth.

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In a historic decision, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court may have ended almost any chance for Lula to run for President in Brazil’s October presidential election. Two days after the decision and violating Judge Sergio Moro’s timeline for arrest, Lula turned himself in to the Federal Police. Markets reacted positively to the news, but the court’s decision will divide an already polarized country and lead to even more uncertainty ahead of the Presidential election.

The vote

On 5 April, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF) decided, by 6 votes to 5, to reject the habeas corpus petition of former President Lula in a trial that lasted almost 11 hours. Lula’s defense team filed a petition for habeas corpus so that he could avoid jail while appealing to the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) and STF.

Ministers Edson Fachin, Alexandre de Moraes, Luis Roberto Barroso, Rosa Weber, Luiz Fux and Carmen Lúcia voted against the habeas corpus, while ministers Gilmar Mendes, Dias Toffoli, Ricardo Lewandowski, Marco Aurélio Mello and Celso de Mello were in favor of the habeas corpus.

While the STF’s decision was deemed controversial, Raquel Dodge, the Prosecutor General of Brazil, commended the decision, stating that the significance of the case could potentially end impunity in Brazil. In a 2016 ruling, the STF decided that defendants convicted at the appeals court level could begin serving their sentence even if there was still an appeal left in the higher courts.

Lula’s defense has the right to one last appeal with the Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region (TRF-4), but the appeal cannot reverse the conviction and acquit the former president. The deadline to file the appeal is 10 April. In almost all circumstances, the court rejects this type of appeal because it is meant to delay the execution of the sentence.

On 5 April, the TRF-4 gave Judge Sérgio Moro the authorization to execute the sentence of former president Lula—sentenced to 12 years and one month in prison for passive corruption and money laundering.

Later that day, Judge Moro ordered the imprisonment of the former president. Lula had until 5pm on 6 April, to voluntarily turn himself in at the headquarters of the Federal Police in Curitiba. After missing the initial deadline and spending two nights in the metallurgical union in Sao Paulo, and continuing negotiations with the Federal Police, Lula finally turned himself in on 7 April.

After sentencing, Lula’s lawyers filed another petition with the STJ to request habeas corpus, claiming that there are still appeals left in the TRF-4 and therefore he should not be required to begin serving his sentence. The STJ denied the habeas corpus petition. After the denial, Lula’s team filed another habeas corpus with the STF which was also denied.

Presidential candidacy

The Workers’ Party (PT) acknowledges that, at this point, Lula’s candidacy is highly unlikely given that there are already talks that suggest that the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) will rule him ineligible under the Clean Slate Law. However, the PT stated they will register Lula’s name as a candidate even if he is in prison.

Political parties have until 15 August, to file the name of their Presidential candidates and the TSE has until 17 September, to accept or reject candidates.

Lula can also request a preliminary injunction to the TSE or a higher court that would allow him to run in the 2018 election. The Clean Slate Law provides someone the possibility of continuing to run for public office if there are still pending case appeals – for Lula that would be the STJ or STF.

PT’s goal is to maintain Lula’s candidacy, under any circumstance, until the TSE rules him ineligible. Only at that point will they begin to consider alternate options. Lula would likely support another PT candidate in the hopes that he can transfer his votes. At this moment, Fernando Haddad appears to be PT’s second choice.

It is unclear how Lula would be able to campaign behind bars. The party’s strategy is to show Lula as the victim of persecution in order to secure sympathizers. However, it would be more difficult for Lula to transfer his votes to Haddad from prison.

Market reaction

The day after the STF decision, the Ibovespa—Brazil’s main stock index—was up close to 2%. The previous day, the index closed down 0.31% due to investors’ concerns over the case. In addition, the dollar fell 0.63% against the real (R$ 3,31) after the decision. In the previous day, it hit a high of R$ 3,3678.

Lula’s prison decision caused these economic indicators to fall—mostly due to the impending political chaos. These political decisions tend to increase market volatility in the short term; however, in the medium term the economy remains at the level of recovery; and, most importantly, in the long term such decisions show the market and investors that Brazilian institutions are working, boosting foreign investment.

A race without Lula is preferable for the market, as he brings uncertainty for the economic future of Brazil given his populist background and the likelihood that he could reverse ongoing reform efforts, especially labor and pension, deemed crucial for fiscal adjustments and balance of public accounts. Lula could have reversed the recent regulation of Petrobras, which can no longer pursue exclusivity over pre-salt exploration and allow for an increase in foreign investment in the sector. Petrobras stock increased over 4% after the ruling.

Lula’s absence will also decrease the polarization that gave Jair Bolsonaro so much popularity. Without Lula, Bolsonaro will lose some support and the race will become wide open again, creating more opportunity for a centrist candidate.

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Latvia held a parliamentary election on 6 October. This saw the success of numerous small parties; notable is the arrival of KPV LV, relative newcomers who gained sixteen seats in the hundred seat Saeima. The previous centre-right coalition forged of three parties all saw their vote share significantly reduced, demonstrating a populist shift in the polling. The Harmony party won most seats (23) but their pro-Russian policies make them unattractive coalition partners. Expect the upcoming weeks to be consumed by movements to form a coalition, which is a mainstay of the Latvian electoral system. Harmony is likely to be excluded again, with a likely coalition of five parties seeking to claim power. This would keep Latvia on its current pro-Western foreign policy track.

Democratic weakness and voter apathy

Since seceding from the Soviet Union in 1991, Latvia has registered continuous population decline caused by emigrations and a low birth rate. It has 1.93 million citizens, down from over 2.6 million in 1990. Latvia also possesses a large ethnic Russian diaspora, forming 26% of its population. The pro-Russian Harmony party are reliant on this demographic as the basis of their electoral success. Their voters are keen to protect the rights of ethnic Russian citizens (a minority of whom are excluded from voting) and ensuring the Russian language is taught in primary education. However, many Latvians view Harmony with suspicion because of its stance and alliances. Party leader Nils Ušakovs’ reluctance to criticise Russia over its Crimean intervention, Harmony’s previous alliance with United Russia (the party of Vladimir Putin), and corruption allegations have compounded this mistrust. The party has been sidelined from Latvian politics, having never previously entered into a coalition.

Unexpected populist gains

Latvia lacks many common factors that give rise to populist groups, hence, favourable populist results for KPV LV are a surprise. The country has enjoyed economic prosperity in recent years with unemployment at a 10-year low. It also has a small immigrant population – immigration traditionally being an all-important issue for populist agendas.. The economy was adversely affected by the 2008 Global Financial Crisis – Latvian GDP collapsed over 25% from pre-crisis levels but recent growth has been exceptionally strong compared to other EU states. Furthermore, Latvia has not experienced a surge of new voters, turnout remains stagnant at 54%. If anything voter turnout is on the wane and remains low when measured against EU counterparts. Therefore, one of the few possible explanations for the rise of populism could be perceived corruption in the establishment. In February, Ilmārs Rimšēvičs, head of Latvia’s central bank was arrested amid corruption allegations.

KPV LV, which stands for ‘Who Owns the State’, are major beneficiaries of this election, with the second most seats in parliament. They are led by actor turned radio host Artus Kaimiņš, who has campaigned on the basis of both anti-EU and anti-immigration sentiments. Their platform is centered firmly against the elite. Kaimiņš arrest, as recently as June amid claims of party funding irregularities, did not reduce anti-establishment resentment.  The Party’s message has resonated with the electorate earning them sixteen seats. However, they have irked many by suggesting an alliance with the pro-Russian Harmony party, which is unprecedented in Latvian politics.

The New Conservative Party, another newcomer, won third-most votes, also gaining sixteen seats. Its campaign was based more firmly on Latvian nationalism and socially conservative values than the centre-left KPV LV; for example, they oppose same-sex marriage and dual state languages. Fighting corruption is another key policy in response to numerous scandals in Latvian politics and business. The New Conservatives leadership contains many former officers from the state anti-corruption organisation. The party also seeks to rectify the weakness of Latvian democracy that is brought about not only by dishonest activities but also by the low voter turnout at Parliamentary elections. Turnout, at 54%, is down from over  80% in 1993. Ruling established parties have suffered heavy losses. Prior to the election a three-party centre-right coalition formed of the Union of Greens and Farmers, National Alliance and Unity Party saw their support eroded, losing 47% of their seats amongst them. The Union of Greens and Farmers, led by the current Prime Minister Māris Kučinskis, came sixth with only eleven seats, compromising their ability to negotiate in the coming all-party discussions.

Outlook

Coalitions are symptomatic of Latvian politics and the outcome of this election is no different. President Raimonds Vējonis will undertake discussions with the seven parties that have won seats. A lengthy and complex series of negotiations to form a government is now ongoing.

Fears of the pro-Russian Harmony party attaining power appear unfounded. Despite reinventing themselves as a Social Democratic Party and shifting away from ties with Putin’s party in Russia, even if Harmony entered an alliance with KPV LV their collective thirty-nine seats would fall well short of an overall majority. Another party would still be required to gain control of the Saeima. Historically, Latvian parties entering a coalition with any pro-Russian party has been considered crossing a red line and remains highly unlikely. It is expected that Harmony will remain an outlier in Latvian politics, unable to wield their numerical advantage to move into the mainstream.

Retaining the status quo of Harmony’s fringe status is imperative to many of its parliamentary adversaries. This is because they fear a pro-Russia party in coalition might bring Latvia away from its westward facing foreign policy. In 2004, it joined both the EU and NATO, which significantly riled Moscow. Today there are over 1,400 NATO troops stationed in the nation, as part of its Enhanced Forward Presence to reinforce security and reassure NATO’s eastern member states. Still, the probable outcome is the continuation of a multi-party coalition which excludes the pro-Russians.

The ethnic divide in Latvian politics remains strong. KPV LV’s inexperience could be disadvantageous in talks and hinder their representatives’ possibility of becoming Prime Minister. One option which is being pushed by Janis Bordans of the New Conservative Party is a five-party alliance which excludes both Harmony and the incumbent Greens, but this has also been met by skepticism. The fact that the second to sixth-placed parties all hold a similar number of seats will make it cumbersome for one party to take the lead in negotiating a potentially fragile coalition.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina held Presidential and Parliamentary elections on 7 October 2018. An ongoing dispute about the electoral law has left the country unable to legally form a government. Despite this, election results indicate the current state of affairs in the country.

In the 2018 elections, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina chose the Bosniak, Serb, and Croat members of the three-person Presidency and the members of the lower house, the House of Representatives. The results show that the votes for the House of Representatives went along ethnic lines, as is usual, and the balance between the parties remained similar, with no party gaining or losing more than two seats.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of 2 main ‘entities’; the Bosniak and Croat dominated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as the Federation), and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska. In the Federation, the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which is also in power in Croatia, remained the largest parties. In the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska, the ruling Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) won the most votes. The Serb and Bosniak candidates for the Presidency echoed the House of Representatives’ results, with the SDA and SNSD candidates winning. The Croatian candidate bucked the trend with the moderate Democratic Front’s (DF) candidate beating the more nationalist HDZ candidate.

None of these political parties will be able to form a government soon due to a quarrel about the electoral law in the Federation. In 2016, the Constitutional Court decided that the way that candidates are elected undermines equality of representation between the three main nationalities, rendering it unconstitutional. The law has not yet been replaced, meaning that any government formed would be constitutionally illegitimate.

An election with no outcome

The Bosnian governmental system is set up to ensure that three main nationalities are all equally represented, this is the rationale behind institutions like the three-person Presidency. The 2016 Constitutional Court case argued that the way politicians are elected in the Federation violates this principle.

The case highlighted that each of the 10 cantons that constitute the Federation are obliged to put forward at least one Bosniak, Serb, and Croat candidate in elections regardless of how many people from each ethnic group live in the canton. For example, a canton where Bosniaks make up 90% of the population still has to elect a Croat candidate. Everyone in the canton, regardless of nationality, can vote for that representative. So, a Croat candidate, mandated to represent Croats could theoretically gain office based on mostly Bosniak votes. This anomaly has become a particularly sensitive issue as the number of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina is declining, due to a low birth rate and high migration, meaning that over time Bosniak votes could become more influential in selecting Croat politicians.

HDZ, which is the ruling party in Croatia and the largest Bosnian Croat party in the House of Representatives, has called for the law to be changed where Bosniaks cannot vote for Croat candidates. Bosniak MPs have accused HDZ of pushing this change in order to widen the divide between Bosniak and Croats. They further suggested it is part of a strategy to push for a third, purely Croat entity that is separate from the Federation.

The Bosnian national parliament has not been able to agree on a new electoral law for the Federation. This has left the country without a method of forming a government that represents the constitutional imperative of equal representation of amongst Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.

Implications of the results

The lack of a national government is not likely to induce serious changes. The extremely devolved governing system into two main entities, with one of them further split into cantons, means the absence of a national government is not as problematic as it would be in more centralised states. The country previously survived 15 months without a government in 2011.

Incumbent parties won the most votes in the elections for the House of Representatives, so the political status quo was largely confirmed. Nationalist parties retained most of the seats in the House of Representatives, demonstrating the enduring importance of ethnicity in Bosnian politics.

The surprise victory of the more moderate DF Croat Presidential candidate Željko Komšić, who promotes coexistence between Croats and Bosniaks, has immediately been interpreted in ethnic terms by HDZ. They have accused Čović of winning with the help of Bosniak votes, thereby tapping into the same issue that resulted in the Federation’s electoral law being declared unconstitutional. Protests have even been staged against the result. By casting Komšić’s victory as an ethnic issue, HDZ hopes to stir up Croatian nationalism and gain more support amongst Bosnian Croats.

The parties elected to the House of Representatives do not work well together because they disagree on fundamental issues, including the legitimacy of the state itself. SNSD has long talked about an independent Republika Srpska, while the idea of greater administrative separation between Bosniaks and Croats has been proposed recently. The prospects of such changes being agreed upon between the various parties are minuscule. They are pipe dreams for now, especially because the USA and EU are highly unlikely to sanction a fundamental restructuring of the country after many years of investment in the current system. The dysfunctional relationship between the political parties means that major social and political reforms are unlikely to occur before the next election.

What next?

The staging of an election without the corresponding formation of a national government is a fitting summation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s current state. The exercise of elections has become a façade covering the cracks of fundamental structural problems. Nationalist parties do not agree on the state’s legitimacy and instead fight each other on ethnically-charged issues, such as the potential dismemberment of the country. The mandated equal representation of nationalities that downed the Federation’s electoral law has also led to the consolidation of ethnically-based parties. These parties cannot compromise with one another, meaning that a new electoral law cannot be agreed upon. Just as the election lacks an underlying legal basis, the state lacks the foundation of cooperation amongst the three main ethnic groups needed for it to function efficiently.

The electoral law dispute has added to a growing pile of outstanding problems with the Bosnian constitution, from the 9-year-old Sejdić and Finci case on the rights of citizens who are not members of the three main ethnic groups, to more prosaic considerations like the words to the national anthem. These issues have and will be argued over at the national level by the elected representatives of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, who do not often agree. There is little prospect of these entrenched ethnic divisions being overcome, as even the historic protests and citizen assemblies of 2014 did not bring new parties to power, or affect any change on the ruling parties’ ethnicity-driven politics.

It is difficult to see Bosnia and Herzegovina progressing unless the major parties move away from ethnic politics. They need to work together to solve the country’s many issues. The lack of political compromise has led to the basic, necessary institution of a national government having an uncertain legal basis. This problem looks set to continue for the foreseeable future. Without efficient governing bodies, the country will be unable to compete effectively with its neighbours in the medium to long-term.

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Earlier in 2018, Nikol Pashinyan made a historic entrance into the helm of Armenian politics after Serzh Sargsyan resigned in the face of large protests. While Pashinyan is making continued efforts to improve Armenia’s image abroad, an important question remains about his leadership towards the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.

On May 8th, 2018, Nikol Pashinyan, a relatively unknown figure in Armenian politics, became the Prime Minister following the resignation of Serzh Sargsyan. Starting on April 13th, Armenians began protesting the nomination of the incumbent Sargsyan for the PM’s post since many saw his rule as corrupt and steering the country away from Europe. At the same time, Armenians have suffered from low wages and living standards. As such, these widespread anti-government demonstrations came to be led by Pashinyan himself, in his Velvet Revolution that saw thousands of Armenians protesting against the corrupt rule of Sargsyan and the Republican Party of Armenia. Not only was this damaging for the ruling elites, but it has also paved the way for progressive and liberal change in the nation.

Pashinyan the Reformer?

Having injected the country with hope, Pashinyan has promised to eradicate the corrupt and nepotistic political elite, and introduce change and opportunities for the younger generations. In recent months, he has been dialoguing with Angela Merkel and attempting to slowly edge Armenia closer to Europe. Nonetheless, with Sargsyan gone, what does this mean for relations with Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh? Following Pashinyan’s stance as a reformer, there is a possibility that he may decide to shake up the balance in this major conflict in the Caucasus. Yet, the possibility of continuing his predecessors approach of ‘business as usual’ also has a great likelihood. To analyse these possibilities, we must first understand the backdrop for the conflict.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict with no end in sight?

Nagorno-Karabakh, a region predominantly consisting of Armenians, was given to the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic in 1923. However, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, Armenian grievances led to a war against the claimants of modern-Azerbaijan beginning in the late 1980s, that resulted in 35,000 people losing their lives. The war culminated in a ceasefire in 1994 with no resolution since, creating a delicate situation in which Armenian forces are in charge of the region de facto, whilst the land is recognised as belonging to Azerbaijan de jure. Both countries are under a constant threat of war from one another, with sporadic bursts of violence taking place frequently over recent years.

However, since 1994, it can be argued that both sides have been intentionally delaying the resolution of the conflict. For Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev and for Armenia’s previous ruling elites, the status quo scenario has been seen as ideal. Essentially, both administrations find it difficult to convince the people about making compromises. The status quo scenario serves interests of ruling elites in both countries, whilst also being a means of invoking nationalism during certain periods such as the fighting in April 2016.

Although, with the resignation of Sargsyan and his cadres, questions remain about Armenian response in the future. Pashinyan is known as a progressive, keen to solve issues in the country, yet how important the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh is for him is still unclear. Whether or not there will be change in Armenian policy and conduct can ultimately only be assessed by his actions and rhetoric in recent months, which have been contrasting.

A Mixed Outlook for the Future

Since he has been acting Prime Minister, Pashinyan is yet to produce a specific and well-planned policy regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the past few months have presented likely possibilities of the stance Pashinyan may undertake in the future.

One of his first official moves as Prime Minister was to visit Nagorno-Karabakh, where he highlighted his desire for a peaceful solution to end the frozen conflict and reiterated the importance of Armenia creating a ‘peace-oriented’ atmosphere to foster developments. Visits to the region are fairly common and serve the purpose of emphasising the links and Armenian nature of Nagorno-Karabakh. He also stressed the importance of the inclusion of representatives from Nagorno-Karabakh in any forms of peace negotiations. Pashinyan further qualified that the increased war rhetoric from Ilham Aliyev, the current President of Azerbaijan, is a ploy by the leader to distract his own population from their ongoing problems, such as a weakening economy and concerns over human rights.

Conversely, in a speech at the UN, Pashinyan adamantly contested that Karabakh must not be a part of Azerbaijan as the intention of the Azeri leadership is to apparently annihilate the Armenian people. Moreover, in a meeting with Russian-Armenian businessmen, he has been quoted as saying that he views Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh) as being a part of Armenia in the future and that Azerbaijan should be questioned further about its intentions on producing peace resolutions. In an odd turn of events, Pashinyan’s son has decided to militarily serve in Nagorno-Karabakh, prompting him to call on Ilham Aliyev’s son to volunteer too, as neither side wants bloodshed or for their children to be injured. Moreover, in the last few weeks, following talks in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, it has been reported that both Aliyev and Pashinyan have decided to de-escalate border incidents. Most recently, however, and quite significant, is that there have been reports that both leaders have now established ‘operative ties’ – something unheard of previously.

Assessing these trends makes it difficult  to decipher Pashinyan’s overall policy. With the beginning of his government, there may have been new hopes for a change on Armenia’s position in the conflict, yet occurrences in the past few months point to the contrary. Although, recent developments do suggest positive steps towards a future peace resolution, something that has been unimaginable in recent years, it is too early to highlight how effective this will be. Ultimately, Pashinyan is yet to set out a  definitive plan and his rhetoric has been inconsistent. What is likely, however, is that Pashinyan may simply be focusing his attention on other matters and leaving this to consider at another point. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, it appears that it will be the maintenance of the status quo under ‘business as usual’. However, the sporadic nature of this conflict means one can never dismiss possibilities of peace or war and leaves uncertainty.

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On 7 October Kosovo went to the polls. Vetëvendosje was the single largest party. Meaning ‘self-determination’, Vetëvendosje has a history of being a protest movement that has criticised the role of the international community in Kosovo. 

A new party in power

Vetëvendosje have broken through by winning 25.49% of the vote, making them the largest single party in the assembly with 31 seats. They were closely followed by LDK who won 30 seats with 24.82% of the vote. PDK, the former party of President Hashim Thaçi, was third with 25 seats.

Vetëvendosje was also the largest party in the last election. Still, they were left out of government after a coalition of PDK, AAK, and NISMA – all of which are headed by former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fighters – took power. The outcome of this election will probably be an LDK-Vetëvendosje coalition. This would leave PDK, the party of many other former members of the KLA, outside of government for the first time since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. PDK’s third-place reflects widespread dissatisfaction with corruption and poor economic performance since 2008. 

Protest party

Vetëvendosje has been a protest movement, and then a protest party for much of its existence. It has called for the ejection of international forces from Kosovo to ensure self-determination for the people of Kosovo. Albin Kurti, the party’s candidate for Prime Minister, was arrested in 2009 when protests organised by Vetëvendosje turned violent. In 2015 and 2016 its MPs regularly released tear gas in the Kosovo Assembly to oppose a border delineation agreement with Montenegro and negotiations with Serbia. It has embraced positions that are often considered radical or nationalist, such as union with Albania. For these reasons, the international community, which has significant clout in Kosovo’s politics, has long been wary of Vetëvendosje. Now, however, their participation in the government cannot be avoided.

LDK

LDK is Kosovo’s oldest political party, founded in 1989. The leader of the non-violent resistance movement to Serbian rule, Ibrahim Rugova, served as its President. It has been in power with PDK as recently as 2017. It has worked together with the UN and EU and was involved in the dialogue with Serbia. The party hopes that its candidate Vjosa Osmani will be selected as Kosovo’s first female prime minister as part of the coalition agreement. The party is broadly centrist, and so will be the more moderate, conservative partner in the coalition. 

Dialogue with Serbia

Vetëvendosje has held a hard-line position on the EU-facilitated dialogue with Serbia. It led the fierce opposition to the creation of the Association of Serbian Municipalities, a vital part of the discussion that has failed to be implemented. It can be expected that Vetëvendosje’s approach will be tempered by the demands of government and the influence of LDK. The new government’s position on the dialogue with Serbia will indicate its overall direction.

The dialogue is currently stalled after the previous government imposed 100% tariffs on Serbian goods. Vetëvendosje has supported these tariffs. Albin Kurti, seen as Vetëvendosje’s candidate for Prime Minister, has stated that he is not eager to revive the talks. 

Relations between the new government and Serbia will be unfriendly at best and may lead to a confrontation. Vetëvendosje’s previous call for union with Albania is anathema to Serbia, which still views Kosovo as a part of its territory. Already Serbian defence minister has called Kurti “scum”, while the head of Serbia’s Office for Kosovo and Metohija Marko Đurić has branded him an “extremist”. 

The Specialist Chambers

The fact that the PDK, AAK and NISMA will not be a part of the government may have significant implications for the work of the Specialist Chambers. The chambers were established to investigate war crimes committed by the KLA from 1998 to 2000. This potentially implicates several former fighters who are now politicians for these three parties. The most high profile potential defendant is ex-Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj of the AAK, who resigned to face questioning and so triggered the latest elections. 

The absence of these former fighters from the government is unusual for Kosovo. It may make it easier for them to be indicted than if they were in government, as they will have fewer ways to block the Chambers’ work. On the other hand, the Chambers’ focus on crimes committed by Albanians has been criticised by MPs from across the political spectrum, including from Vetëvendosje.  

Prospects for the coalition

Relations with the EU, UN, and Serbia can be expected to deteriorate if Albin Kurti becomes Prime Minister and seeks to implement Vetëvendosje’s more controversial policies. This could make it challenging to keep the LDK on board with the coalition. If the LDK gains important positions, such as Osmani as Prime Minister, then these relationships have a better chance of being maintained. Whatever happens, it will be difficult to reconcile the more extreme positions endorsed by Vetëvendosje with the more moderate attitude of the LDK. Kosovo has a history of short-lived coalition governments. There have been 5 elections in 12 years. The new government may well follow many of its predecessors in not seeing out its term.

The post Parliamentary elections in Kosovo appeared first on Global Risk Insights.

What happened?

Cote d’Ivoire’s President Alassane Dramane Ouattara increased the possibility of political instability when he announced in August that he was running for a controversial third term. The move comes at a time when the country’s economic forecast has been downgraded due to COVID-19, and the region is experiencing a rash of leaders trying to extend their time in office—a trend called third-termism, as well as increasing activity from violent extremist organizations.

President Ouattara’s plans to peacefully transition power for the first time in the country’s history were upended when his chosen successor Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly died just three months before the next election and the alternate candidate, Defense Minister Hamed Bakayoko was linked to a drug trafficking scheme. Senior officials in the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP, the ruling coalition of political parties) pressured Ouattara to renege on his promise not to run again in order to fill the void left by Coulibaly. The August 8 announcement set off a wave of protests in the country that were met with violent repression and left eight people dead—underscoring how fragile the situation is in the former French colony.

In response to Ouattara’s announcement, opposition candidate and former president Henri Konan Bédié of the PDCI party asked the other opposition parties, including members from the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI, former president Laurent Gbagbo’s party) and Generations and People in Solidarity (GPS, former rebel leader Guillame Soro’s party) who are both barred from the election, to stand against Ouattara and called for public protests. The opposition has also demanded nationwide reforms in exchange for their continued participation in the election. Their reform requirements include: Ouattara’s withdrawal from the ballot; the dissolution of the constitutional council; the dissolution of the electoral commission; and reform of the entire election framework. The move has essentially deadlocked the electoral process.

Why does it matter?

Politically

Ouattara is abandoning democratic norms by appearing to tamper with the election. The Constitutional Council, most of whom are appointed by the president, not only allowed the dubious third term run, but also approved only 3 candidates out of 44 applicants to stand against the incumbent:

1) Former President Henri Konan Bédié (PDCI) – a former Ouattara ally in the past two elections. The alliance fell apart in 2018 when Ouattara would not commit to fielding a candidate from the PDCI camp.

2) Former Prime Minister Pascal Affi N’Guessan (FPI) – assumed control of the FPI after Gbagbo was exiled. N’Guessan is a weak candidate who garnered less than 5% of the vote in 2015.

3) Kouadio Konan Bertin (Independent) – a former PDCI member but left after a disagreement with Bédié. He is another weak candidate who earned less than 5% of the vote in 2015.

N’Guessan and Bertin are very weak politically and have the potential to draw votes away from Bédié, the one serious contender, while not being a threat to Ouattara. Additionally, the government has excluded the very popular Gbagbo and Soro from the election for having criminal convictions against them—convictions the Ivorian government imposed.

The president argues updating the constitution in 2016 reset his term limits, allowing him to serve until 2030. In fact, the constitution is ambiguous regarding term limits across previous versions. However, the opposition parties are firm in their disagreement. They contend Ouattara has served his two terms and should step aside. Ouattara’s maneuvering may get him reelected but invites uncertainty about the legitimacy of the election and will incur, at best, legal challenges if he wins or, at worst, another coup.

Economically

Ivory Coast’s fast-growing economy has slowed recently due to COVID-19. Trading Economics lists 2019 GDP at just under 7 percent, but in the second quarter of 2020 GDP fell to less than 4 percent. Despite its economic strength, the country has a high poverty rate of 46 percent—indicating not everyone benefits from the strong economy. The World Bank indicates more private investment is needed for Ivory Coast to sustain its growth and make the economy more equitable. COVID-19 will continue to dampen the country’s economic growth at least through 2020. Any political instability will drag the economy down further and deter private investment.

Security

Africa in general and West Africa in particular is under siege by violent extremist organizations (VEO), like Islamic State and al-Qaeda regional affiliates, looking for a new base of operations after the war in Syria and Iraq pushed them from their usual operating areas. These groups repeatedly turn to Africa as a new base of operations. This is in part thanks to many of the countries’ relatively porous borders, large populations of unemployed young people, weak governments and security, and numerous ethnic divisions which all conspire to give these VEOs a foothold in the societies they target.

An outpost on the northern border of Ivory Coast was recently attacked in retaliation for participating in a joint counter-terrorism operation with Burkina Faso, in which over a dozen Ivorian soldiers were killed or injured. Domestic conflict in Ivory Coast would provide an opportunity for more attacks and a chance for VEOs to operate in the country.

Regional Precedent

Ouattara is not the only West African leader seeking a controversial third term. Leaders from Egypt, Uganda, and Comoros have all used political maneuvers to increase their terms. President Alpha Condé of Guinea also wishes to extend his stay in power by the same mechanism Ouattara is using—implementing a new constitution to reset term limits.

The African Union even has a formal declaration prohibiting such acts. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance “prohibits any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments that constitute an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.” But it has yet to act on it, preferring instead to use “quiet diplomacy.”

How the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the international community choose to treat Ouattara’s constitutional coup will have repercussions across the region as other leaders look for winning strategies to extend their control.

What comes next?

The potential outcomes around the election are difficult to predict. However, the opposition already views the electoral commission (the independent body that oversees the election) as biased. They have made it plain that they believe President Ouattara’s third term bid is unconstitutional and therefore illegitimate; and they have called for public protests against his running. In fact, two electoral commissioners have resigned in protest calling for a delay of the election until the commission is reformed.

For its part, the Ouattara administration has grown increasingly authoritarian. As Jessica Moody at Foreign Policy noted, “the president’s increasing tendency toward policies that contravene human rights, due process, and freedom of speech has gotten far less attention than his country’s growth and progress.” Indeed, Amnesty International documented uniformed police standing by while armed, plain-clothes men attacked unarmed citizens protesting Ouattara’s third term bid.

Ivory Coast has all of the necessary elements for conflict around the October election—rising inequality, corruption, high youth unemployment, ethnic tension, political resentment, repression, and three leaders’ commitment to a decades-old feud that has no place in civil society.

The post Ivory Coast’s Election is Heading Off the Rails appeared first on Global Risk Insights.

After the outbreak of protests in 2019, calls from Chileans for significant reform to overcome what they saw as an increasingly unequal and corrupt society grew louder and louder. In response, Chile’s political parties came to an agreement, pledging to hold a plebiscite for a new constitution. Though originally scheduled for 26th April, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic led this vote to be postponed until 25th October. What has the outcome of the vote been, and what changes can we expect there to be in the coming months and years as a result?

Background

At the start of October 2019, a price hike on public transport in Chile’s capital, Santiago, sparked protests which grew from a fare-dodging campaign by students to encompass over 3.7 million protesters by the end of the month. The protests have been called the worst civil unrest since the end of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship in 1990. More than a complaint about metro fares, the protests represented the frustration of a growing number of Chileans about high levels of income inequality and a rising cost of living which Chile’s pension system and minimum wage are increasingly unable to cover.

Though protests dwindled over the remainder of 2019, the situation worsened again at the end of January this year after incidents such as the death of Jorge Mora, a football fan run over by a police vehicle in the midst of a disturbance outside Santiago’s Monumental stadium. Mora’s death is just one example of recent controversy surrounding Chile’s police force, known as the Carabineros. The Carabineros faced broad criticism this October after an officer was recorded throwing a 16-year old boy from a bridge; protesters have pointed to these and other incidents as proof that a Pinochet era-style attitude of aggression still exists in Chile’s police that needs serious reform.

In response to the unrest, President Sebastián Piñera announced a range of reforms in education, healthcare and the country’s pension system. Most importantly, ten parties in government and the opposition signed an agreement to hold a plebiscite on a new constitution. 

The Vote’s Outcome

Turnout for the vote on 25th October was around 51%, slightly higher than the turnout for 2017’s presidential election. Those who voted were overwhelmingly in favour of constitutional change, with 78% in favour. 79% of voters expressed their preference for a fully elected constitutional convention to draft the new constitution, as opposed to a mixed convention split between sitting members of Chile’s Congress and elected citizens. The election to determine the constitutional convention is set to occur in April 2021; the new constitution is set to come into force in 2022 after another referendum to ascertain the public’s approval or disapproval of the new document. 

The vote for a fully elected constitutional convention arguably opens up the possibility for a new constitution that departs more radically from the current one. A fully elected convention would mean an ostensibly lower level of influence from Chile’s political establishment and the more active involvement of civil society groups. On the other hand, the fact that Chile uses the d’Hondt method for its electoral process might mean that the new constitution will not be so different from the current one. This is because the d’Hondt method favours large parties and coalitions. Consequently, if candidates for the constituent assembly organise along political lines to increase their electoral advantage, the constituent assembly may end up resembling Congress anyway.

Constitutional Consequences

What can we expect now that Chile has voted in favour of a new constitution? In the short term, it is reasonable to expect that Chile’s economy may be detrimentally impacted by political and economic uncertainty, already present since the protests erupted last year and enhanced by the COVID-19 pandemic. It is possible that, in anticipation of constitutional changes that may negatively affect businesses such as new or strengthened regulations, businesses (particularly foreign companies) will scale back investment in Chile. This possibility ties into a risk which critics of constitutional change have raised: namely that if the constitution leads to increased public spending on welfare schemes and enshrines greater state involvement or intervention in the country’s economy, Chile will be detrimentally affected in the longer term. They fear that such changes would discourage investment and curb growth.

On the other hand, some of the changes which opposition groups have been calling for are likely to benefit the country’s growth, at least in the longer term. Calls to enshrine new or expanded systems of education, healthcare and social support in the new constitution, if implemented, are likely to help Chile enhance productivity and build a more skilled workforce. Similarly, if the new constitution is successful in promoting political transparency and discouraging corruption, foreign investment is likely to take a positive turn. Either way, the success of the campaign for constitutional change is very likely to diffuse the tensions and agitation which have been apparent in Chile since the 2019 protests and thus provide a valuable opportunity for people to move on from these political tensions and for businesses affected by the protests to recover.

One area where constitutional change is likely is regarding the status of water: Chile’s current constitution enshrines a person’s right to have private ownership of water resources separate from the land the water is in or flows through. This led to the privatisation of many water sources in Chile and the treatment of water as a tradeable commodity; this system has been criticised for leading to inequality of water access and for contributing to environmental issues such as the problem of water conservation. Efforts to make water a public good are likely to reduce tariffs, benefitting small farmers, and contribute to progress on these issues.

October’s plebiscite represents a momentous turning point for the country; though constitutional change is likely to have risks in the short term, the indications for long-term growth are promising.

The post Chile Chooses Change: What October’s Vote Means for the Country appeared first on Global Risk Insights.

In early October, Bolivia’s Movement towards Socialism (MAS) won a landslide victory against opponents in the state’s most general recent elections, with presidential candidate Luis Arce clasping victory in the first round. But will this mean a return of Evo Morales, former president and heavyweight in Bolivian politics, who went into self-exile after protests over accusations of fraud in the 2019 elections? Does the case of Bolivia hint at a return to the pink tide of left-wing politicians in Latin America?

Over the past year, Bolivian nationals have gone through a political whirlwind. After a series of irregularities were reported in last year’s elections, where the long-standing incumbent Evo Morales claimed victory, the country went into mass protests and riots, some of which lasted almost a month. Some of this anger had its roots in a Supreme Court decision in 2018 to scrap term limits for the presidency and thus allowing Morales to run for a fourth time, despite voters narrowly rejecting a constitutional amendment to let him run again in a national referendum. With Morales fleeing the country, Jeanine Áñez, a politician of the opposition party, the Democrat Social Movement, became interim president until elections could take place again.

However, October’s vote reflected how some of her transitional administration’s policies as well as her handling of the pandemic, has not been widely received by the Bolivian people. Whilst many saw last year’s events as a move away from the socialist policies enacted by the MAS towards a market-driven economy, it seems that the current socio-economic situation, magnified by the pandemic, has tainted public opinion on both Áñez and her allies, but also what Bolivia without the MAS would look like. On the other hand, the possible return of Morales persisted as a deterrent to undecided voters in trusting the MAS again, an idea which the opposition frequently invoked in their depiction of Arce as Morales. Nevertheless, Arce’s resounding victory, winning over 55% of votes in the first round, can be put down to a number of reasons.

Arce, the right man for the job

First, as finance minister under Morales for over ten years, Arce oversaw a massive reduction in poverty and economic growth through policies such as the nationalisation of oil and gas industries. For this reason, he is seen as the provider of tangible improvements to Bolivia’s socio-economic situation. Second, he still appeals to the indigenous majority of the Bolivian population, which show loyal ties to the MAS party, as well as other traditional Morales supporters from working class backgrounds. However, as a quiet technocrat, Arce has distinguished himself from Morales, stating explicitly on numerous occasions that his victory will not signify a return to politics for the former president, and that he is a very different character. This seems to have calmed worried voters regarding whether Morales will climb back to power, despite Morales reassuring supporters that he will be returning to Bolivian politics. 

Increasingly, many have begun to speculate on Arce’s victory, and how this will re-energise Latin America’s left, known for economic justice policies, which may prove popular in present day where poverty is expected to surge to 37% in the region.

Latin America’s Pink Tide

From the early 2000s, leftist governments began dominating the political sphere in the region, particularly in South America, a phenomenon labelled the “pink tide”. Populist leaders such as Hugo Chavez from Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Lula da Silva in Brazil, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina and Morales in Bolivia promised economic reform and social transformation in the most unequal continent in the world, whilst denouncing the role played by neoliberalism. Some of their policies contributed to a reduction in hunger and poverty in the region, and many of these leaders are recognised for amplifying democratic participation to include the most marginalised communities, such as the indigenous in Bolivia. 

However, over time, most of these “pink” administrations fell out of power and were replaced by centre or right-wing governments. The notable exception here is Venezuela, now under Chavez’s protege and former vice-president, Nicolas Maduro, and viewed widely as a failed state. By 2013, Latin America was no longer benefiting from the high Chinese demand for commodities, and economic advances began to wane, indicating a mismanagement of government finances and unsustainable fiscal and monetary policies. In addition, it became clear that with some of these charismatic leaders, the fundamental democratic principles of many states began to be compromised. 

Left to right: Fernando Lugo, former president of Paraguay; Evo Morales of Bolivia; Lula da Silva of Brazil; Rafael Correa of Ecuador; Hugo Chavez of Venezuela at the World Social Forum, 2009. 

Is change in the air?

Bolivia’s election result, as well as the wave of recent protests across countries including Ecuador, Colombia and Chile, all of which are governed by right-wing parties, have fuelled the idea that a return of pink tide politics in the region is very likely. Dissatisfaction seems omnipresent: public outrage over police violence and the killings of social leaders in Colombia, last year’s national shutdowns in Ecuador over attempts to remove fuel subsidies, and the demonstrations in Chile over drastic inequality which culminated in an overwhelming vote this October to rewrite the constitution. In Ecuador, which is due to hold its presidential elections in February, leftist candidate and Rafael Correa’s pick, Andrés Arauz, is leading in the polls. Right-wing Martin Vizcarra, president of Peru, has also witnessed a slump in his ratings. However, as Vizcarra and other figures facing unpopularity show, public dissatisfaction and demands for change cannot be put down to solely a desire for leftist politics to return.

Dissatisfaction beyond ideological grounds

As the region most affected by the pandemic, Latin America has proven that no leader is immune to criticism on how they have managed the health emergency. Vizcarra, criticised mainly for lockdown measures that devastated Peru’s economy as well as having one of the world’s highest death tolls, is not alone in this respect. Argentina’s left wing president, Alberto Fernandez, has witnessed protests and criticism over his handling of the virus and the economy. Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, puts the wave of general disgruntlement down to a regional trend to punish incumbents for failing to deliver in tough times. In this way, it is extremely likely that we will continue to see mass protests across Latin America, particularly when pandemic lockdown measures are eased, but these will reflect discontent across the spectrum.

On the other hand, the two leaders that have come out of the pandemic the most unscathed in the region are surprisingly the largest populists. Mexican president, Lopez-Obrador, commonly referred to as AMLO, and Jair Bolsonaro, president of Brazil, have not witnessed a slump in their approval ratings on the same scale as almost every other leader in Latin America. Whilst at polar opposites of the political spectrum, both leaders were hesitant to enact immediate lockdown measures, but have nevertheless retained their popularity among their loyal base of supporters and are now facing a lesser degree of economic contraction. Thus, whilst the pandemic, blind to political ideology, has caused public anger towards their leaders, AMLO and Bolsonaro show that elements of both right and left wing populism will very likely remain formidable in Latin American politics as for the foreseeable future.

Lastly, the Maduro regime in Venezuela, seen as the last holdout of the pink tide, serves as both a reminder and a warning to those wishing to look back at the wave of leftist governments with rose-tinted glasses. Venezuela is often employed by right wing politicians to deter voters from the left, invoking a fear that it would inevitably bring about similar economic catastrophe and social chaos. Instead, public discontent is likely to shift towards the direction of pragmatism, rejecting economic inequality whilst remaining wary of leaders promising the same radical change that defined the pink tide.

The vote in Bolivia epitomises this new direction. Whilst the MAS has managed to come back into power, Arce will need to carefully navigate through the detrimental effects of the pandemic on poverty and economic growth. These are very different circumstances to those during his time as finance minister where his nationalisation policies took place within a boom in natural gas prices, which may challenge his support amongst MAS’s traditional supporters. Nevertheless, he must equally prove to the Bolivian people that he is not simply a vessel for Morales to return to power, and that the country’s politics will not be subsumed in a greater regional trend that allows populist leaders to cling onto the peripheries of politics. Voters in Bolivia, along with other states in Latin America, are demanding new change in their politics, one that cannot be simply painted over with a pink brush.

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As the end of 2020 approaches, incipient forecasts about Brazil’s 2022 general election scenario start emerging. As the recent years — and even months — have insistently shown, new facts can easily move the needle towards unforeseen directions, which demands continuous monitoring and analysis. As of December 2020, however, these are the main insights for a forecast on the outcome of Brazil’s 2022 election for President.

Scenario 1: Bolsonaro is Reelected

The most likely scenario still points to President Bolsonaro’s reelection. So far, the main driver of this trend is that no opposition group has been able to rally a competitive and organised political coalition against Bolsonaro’s agenda. In the meantime, and contrary to initial assessments, the COVID19 pandemic has not significantly damaged the President’s approval ratings, which actually increased during the period. Bolstered by such ratings, and despite being elected as a polarising outsider back in 2018, Bolsonaro has managed to build a pragmatic alliance with the establishment of Brazil’s National Congress (“Centrão”), at least around the political stability of his administration. Furthermore, like in most presidential regimes, the incumbent President of Brazil leverages considerable political power to the detriment of any challengers: no President has ever lost a reelection bid. 

Reelection will mean the continuation of Bolsonaro’s administration policies. As such, the agricultural industry will likely remain the backbone of the government’s economic strategy. The privatisation program focused on infrastructure projects and assets will likely remain the flagship of the government’s investment strategy, even though the specific privatisation agenda of public companies has not produced any concrete results as of yet.

Simultaneously, controversial environmental policies will keep hindering the country’s international positioning as a global hub for sustainable investment — even if Environment Minister Salles is replaced — , e.g., hampering Mercosur’s trade agreement with the European Union. Corruption scandals will continue to embarrass the President and his family, especially his eldest son, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro from Rio de Janeiro.

Recent statements by the President indicating that he was still not sure about running again in 2022 are extremely misleading and must be interpreted as mere distractions from the Federal Government’s controversial measures, such as its mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic policy response, or its choice to neglect the spiking deforestation in the Amazon, or the structural economic meltdown of the country. Finally, the vast support that Brazilian conservatism currently enjoys in public opinion might likely lead to a plethora of similar right-wing candidacies, formally competing against Bolsonaro at least in the first round of the election, which would hinder any chances of Bolsonaro winning reelection without a second round. 

Scenario 2: The Opposition Wins

In the second most likely scenario, Bolsonaro is replaced by one of the leaders in the opposition. The critical medium-term trend towards this scenario is the imminent end of the government’s monthly focalised emergency aid of BRL 600 (around USD $100) to Brazil’s lowest income population, which threatens the government’s approval ratings. On the electoral front, the outcome of Brazil’s regional elections for Mayors and City Councillors in 2020 have boosted Bolsonaro’s adversaries, as candidates backed by the President’s allies have lost in electorally crucial cities like São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Belém and Recife. 

On the ideological front, Donald Trump’s defeat also represents a significant blow to the morale of Bolsonaro, his supporters, and their rhetoric. Former President Trump’s tactic of making baseless claims of election fraud might possibly inspire Bolsonaro in the same direction in 2022 if the President believes his reelection bid will likely fail in the polls.

While it remains unclear who the strongest challenger to Bolsonaro will be, the main players as of now are former Governor of Ceará Ciro Gomes (PDT), Governor of São Paulo João Doria (PSDB), former Justice Minister Sergio Moro (no party yet), TV host Luciano Huck (no party yet) and former President Lula, which will possibly pick Governor Rui Costa or Senator Jacques Wagner — both from the state of Bahia — as his Worker’s Party (PT) candidate for President. 

More left-wing candidates, such as Ciro Gomes and Lula’s candidate stand for a new developmentalist mindset, mobilising government spending towards infrastructure projects and antagonising Brazil’s financial industry. More right-wing candidates such as Huck, Doria and Moro stand for a more liberal economic agenda focused on addressing the government’s fiscal challenge to the detriment of public spending. 

Regardless of the outcome in 2022, Brazil’s prolonged economic crisis forces upon candidates the issue of economic recovery as the top priority in the electoral agenda — unlike the 2018 election in which corruption, violence, and moral issues were at the centre. In that context, consensus already exists on the return to more pragmatic and trade-focused diplomacy, an environmental policy that complies with international standards, especially for the Amazon region, and an economic policy strategy for increasing Brazilian productivity.

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On Tuesday 22 December 2020, the Knesset failed to pass an annual budget, automatically triggering an election. Israelis will head to the polls on 23 March 2021, facing an election during a pandemic for the second time. While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has had a string of electoral successes over the past decade, his path to retaining power does not look smooth. The Prime Minister has frequently referred to his opponents in previous elections as ‘weak leftists’ however his rivals in this election share his conservative beliefs.

A Blow to Blue and White

Benny Gantz leads Israel’s Blue and White party, which was the state’s second largest party until only months ago.  Now Gantz and his party look set to face electoral annihilation in 2021.  Gantz previously posed the biggest rival to Netanyahu, facing him in three elections, before agreeing to form a coalition with the Prime Minister.  However, Gantz was met with disapproval when he formed a coalition with Netanyahu’s centre-right Likud party in April 2020. Many had voted for Blue and White as an alternative to Netanyahu, not to prop up his government. Further, the compromise meant that positions had to be found for Blue and White members and the cabinet increased to 34. This expansion of bureaucracy came at a large cost, with whole departments being founded at a time when the pandemic made a million Israelis unemployed.

Indeed, a poll conducted earlier this month for the Jerusalem Post and Ma’ariv predicted the Blue and White party would only win four seats if the election was held in December and was edging towards the electoral threshold with only 3.25%. Blue and White candidates have dwindled from 33 in March 2020 to now only 9. This fleeing from the sinking ship suggests there is little optimism internally about how the party can build back support.

‘New Hope’

Disapproval of Gantz and the resignation of Blue and White party members suggests Netanyahu’s greatest threat may, this time, come from elsewhere. Former Likud education minister, Gideon Saar, announced his shock resignation from the Knesset on the 8th of December and followed this up by creating his own party named New Hope. Saar’s party attracted Likud representatives such as Michal Shir, who endorsed Saar’s mission to overthrow Netanyahu.

Indeed, the presence of a new and competitive centre-right party may present the biggest challenge to Netanyahu. A survey has predicted 21 seats for Saar’s new party, only five less than Likud. Further, Kan public TV’s survey carried out on the 22 Dec showed Saar polling evenly with the incumbent Prime Minister. If New Hope partnered with other anti-Netanyahu groups such as Yesh Atid, Yamina, Blue and White and Yisrael Beytenu, an anti-Netanyahu coalition is likely to outnumber Likud and its allies.

Bennett’s Boost

Naftali Bennett built up a following throughout the pandemic by advocating for small businesses during the lockdown period and demonstrating resourcefulness in his position as defence minister. Bennett had the Israeli Defence Force provide healthcare organisations with research and technology, opened up hotels for coronavirus patients and sought the formation of a national diagnosis centre. This has rendered Bennett popular amongst the electorate, while Bennett’s conservative party, Yamina, has only six legislators in the Knesset as of 2020.  Bennett’s party is predicted to achieve 21 seats in the March 2021 elections.

However, Bennett’s right-wing positions will struggle to win over centrist voters, despite his secular position, due to his militancy on foreign affairs. The former Likud minister previously stated that Israeli’s ‘must give [their] lives’ to the annexation of the West Bank and has been critical of a two-state solution.

Netanyahu’s Path to Power

The coming election will coincide with Netanyahu’s corruption trial, which could require him to make a series of court appearances.  Netanyahu’s charges of bribery and breach of trust will be central in his opponent’s anti-Netanyahu rhetoric — on top of this an electoral candidate facing a jury sends a negative message to the electorate.

However, Netanyahu does have some successes from the past two years which he can play on in an attempt to drum up support. The Abraham Accords, which were signed in 2020 and may lead to further normalisation agreements in 2021, point to his diplomatic efforts bringing economic and security benefits to the state. Netanyahu also aims to roll out 60,000 vaccines a day which — if successful — could reduce the public’s disapproval over his government’s handling of the pandemic.

Likelihood of a Netanyahu victory?

Despite policy concerns over Israeli relations with the U.S., security in the region, economic recovery and health policy, the real issue on the ballot for many Israelis will be — do we want Netanyahu to remain Prime Minister? Popular adversaries on the right present a threat to Likud’s hegemony on Israeli conservatism and will be likely to pull votes away from the party. Both Bennett and Saar have stated they will not enter a government with Likud, if both parties hold this line it would likely deny Netanyahu the ability to form a government.

While Netanyahu may not be able to form a government post-election, Bennett and Saar — the most likely candidates for Prime Minister — also share the same pro-settlement, conservative policies. The Prime Minister may change; however the policies of the new government would likely remain similar.

It will be difficult for either Netanyahu, Saar or Bennnet to achieve a coalition without gaining the support of one of these other prime ministerial candidates. Whatever the outcome of this election, the political instability in the nation is likely to continue. While the elections are still weeks away, it looks to be a slim majority for either Netanyau, or an anti-Netanyahu alliance. This could result in difficulty passing policy and a continuation of the political uncertainty Israel has endured over the past several years.

The post After Coalition Collapse, Israel faces its Fourth Election in Two Years appeared first on Global Risk Insights.

On February 14th, 2021 Kosovo held its sixth parliamentary election in fourteen years. The result was a resounding victory for Albin Kurti and his left-leaning Vetevendosje party, gaining just over 48% of votes. This will likely transform the tone of Kosovo’s domestic politics, but Kurti’s ability to deliver on his wide-ranging promises may be limited by the state’s difficult realities. More definitively, his pro-Albanian stance makes it highly unlikely that Kosova-Serb relations will see any meaningful improvement. 

An unstable political past

Vetevendosje’s victory marks the latest twist in the complicated recent history of Kosovan politics. Kurti himself was Prime Minister as recently as March 2020, when his coalition government was brought down after just 51 days.

Although accusations of US political meddling emerged in the aftermath – the Trump administration is claimed to have pressured Kurti’s removal due to his non-compliance with its regional peace initiatives – the more  prevalent trigger was a general mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Replacing him was another coalition led by Avdullah Hoti, leader of the centrist Democratic League of Kosovo. Ruling with a one-seat majority, Hoti failed to bring about any improvements, with Kosovo suffering from a deepening economic crisis and no organised vaccination programme to speak of.

On 21st December, Hoti’s coalition collapsed with the revelation that one of the elected MPs had a fraud conviction, thereby constitutionally invalidating the whole electoral process. A new election was rapidly scheduled for the 14th February, bringing us to where we are today.

Adding to this complex situation was the fact that Kurti himself was actually banned from running due to a 2018 conviction for setting off tear gas in the Kosovan parliament. Nonetheless, he will still act as Prime Minister, and will likely bring about important shifts in the state’s domestic and foreign policy.

Domestic implications of victory

Domestically speaking, Kurti now holds a greatly enhanced mandate and capability to carry out his anti-establishment programme. This represented a significant part of his campaigning, with repeated insistence that he would usher in a new generation of politicians – both in terms of age and mindset.

In practice the major aspect of this is anti-corruption, with Vetevendosje’s manifesto pledging to increase government transparency amongst other things. In Kosovo this is important: political elites are often accused of corrupt and nepotistic practices by a population which sees them as out of touch with their reality as inhabitants of one of Europe’s poorest states. Beyond this, the programme is relatively progressive with views for an expanded welfare state and greater state economic intervention.

Of course, such promises bring high expectations with them. Kosovans have a genuine sense that Kurti with his enhanced political position will be able to change things to a greater extent than was possible during his brief stint in power last year. Failure in this regard will only compound the deep pessimism many in the fledgling state feel over their chaotic political system.

Looking further afield

Kurti’s election equally has important consequences beyond Kosovo’s borders. The relationship with Serbia is undoubtedly the most important of these.

Serbia has viewed Kosovo as a breakaway province since the war of 1998-1999. It maintained this stance through a period of UN administration, and has continued to do so since Kosovo’s independence in 2008.

Last year, President Trump attempted to broker a deal as part of his broader global peace initiatives. The resulting agreement did establish slightly closer ties between Belgrade and Pristina, but despite the fanfare, little of long-term relevance was actually achieved.

This stalemate looks set to continue or even worsen under Kurti. He is known for a hard-line stance against cooperating with Serbia under conditions where the northern neighbour refuses to recognise Kosovo’s independence. This same logic will be applied to other states which withhold recognition, potentially leading to frostier relations with neighbours such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as larger global geopolitical players including Russia.

Notwithstanding these bilateral complications, the continued friction with Serbia means that both states’ bids for EU membership will see little progress. Instead, Kurti’s Albanian nationalist instincts will likely mean continued tightening of relations between Kosovo and Albania. Although remaining highly unlikely, in the past Kurti has even alluded to the prospect of unification.

Will anything actually change?

Kosovans are all too aware that the promises made by politicians often do not translate into reality. However, Kurti’s emphasis on shaking up the political system should be taken seriously. His history of activism and his alliance with the equally charismatic Acting President Vjosa Osmani – one of Kosovo’s most prominent female politicians – make it highly likely that steps will be taken to fight the blight of corruption.

However, whether his broader programme will improve conditions within Kosovo remains questionable. COVID-19 is an enormous challenge for any state, let alone one with difficult economic circumstances, and with such a delicate and controversial geopolitical position. In this context, making a positive impact will likely be challenging.

Of greater certainty however is the Serbian issue. With Kurti in charge, any improvement in relations is highly unlikely given his nationalistic viewpoints and uncompromising negotiating style. Predictions of future EU accession therefore must remain distant and speculative, unless major change instead occurs in Serbia – an equally unlikely prospect in itself.

Author: Oliver Moffat

The post A Never-Ending Saga: Kosovo’s Elections appeared first on Global Risk Insights.

2022 is a significant year for France. France starts the year with the Council of the European Union presidency. France’s agenda for the next six months is ambitious and could begin a new era in Europe if successful. But, more critically, France is holding it’s presidential election. Current President, Emmanuel Macron, faces stiff competition in this year’s presidential election. Two far-right candidates, Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour have been close to Macron in polls over the past year. Yet, the nominee from Les Republicains, Valerie Pecresse, the current president of Ile-de-France and former French Minister of the Budget, has overtaken Le Pen and Zemmour and zeroed in on Macron.

Valerie Pecresse: Can she win?

The biggest question facing Valerie Pecresse is whether or not she can defeat Macron. Since being elected by Les Republicains, Valerie Pecresse has placed second in 20 of 22 presidential election polls. However, the Les Republicains candidate still only manages to poll, on average, 2 points ahead of Le Pen and Zemmour. Yet, she meets the requirements to make it to the second round. Polls pitted Pecresse in a second-round showdown against Macron, in which she has recently scored 2 points behind Macron.

Further, history sheds some insight into Valerie Pecresse’s chances. Since World War Two, the centre-right has been the most popular faction. Eight out of the last 13 presidents have been centre-right and ruled for 60% of the time since the war’s end. Much of this is due to Charles de Gaulle, building off of his image as a war hero. De Gaulle founded the basis of Gaullism, a combination of French exceptionalism, strong central government, national sovereignty and centrist pragmatism. All of this led to a platform that emphasized the will of the people and strengthened France’s social conscience, a popular combination repeated by successive Gaullist candidates.

Today Pecresse and her party, Les Republicains, have taken up the centre-right mantle. History suggests they can be just as successful as past centre-right candidates. With pressure mounting upon the incumbent and polls showing a non-existent centre-left competitor, the centre-right has every reason to be optimistic about returning to power.

Finally, Pecresse herself has had significant electoral success leading up to this moment. Pecresse is currently the president of Ile-de-France, France’s most populous region and includes the city of Paris. Winning this region is noteworthy, as it is relatively left-leaning. If Pecresse can win this region, she should have a fighting chance to win the rest of France. Further, being president of Ile-de-France allows Pecresse a better stage to show her accomplishments and demonstrate how effective she is at governing.

Pecresse is not just another challenger to Macron. There is every reason that she can win the presidency of France. But how would a Pecresse presidency operate on the international stage towards allies and foes alike?

How might France change on the global stage?

If Valerie Pecresse wins the presidency, how might she seek to shape France’s global role and relationships with other nations? Pecresse’s manifesto is central in understanding her philosophy and how she may steer France in international affairs.

The first thing to understand is how Pecresse views France’s place in the world order. The initial paragraph of the manifesto asserts that France is the only nuclear power and permanent member of the UN Security Council among members of the EU, which is true. But the language is aimed to assert France’s primacy in the EU. France, in this view, is the leading military force on the continent and has a special duty to lead the continental bloc.

Pecresse’s view of France’s role in European affairs is consistent with the country’s view of itself throughout history. France’s belief in its continental primacy started in 508, as Clovis King of the Franks was the first to be baptised as Roman Catholic, setting the polity on course to lead the conversion of the rest of the continent. French kings led crusades, Paris was one of the first universities and absolutism was perfected by French kings. Some credit even the enlightenment to have started in France, though the country undoubtedly drove revolution and republicanism in Europe. 

Thus, if Pecresse is elected president, there could be a shift in rhetoric and action in reasserting France’s role in Europe. With Germany traditionally being more passive in security and foreign affairs and the absence of the United Kingdom, no other EU nation has the military power, diplomacy or historical conviction of a France under Pecresse’s leadership. Though coalitions of states could push back at French attempts to shape the EU, it historically is unlikely, and the French may further shape the EU in their image.

Other than immigration and utilizing EU economic power as an arm of French foreign policy, Pecresse has stated her support for the EU’s Green Deal, but where nuclear power is recognised as a pillar of a sustainable future. EU industry could be reshaped, as Pecresse is an advocate for supporting “national champions” to better compete in the global economy: that is, she wishes to reverse anti-competition rules that weaken Europe’s largest companies, while also adding a “European preference” to the public procurement code.

On the subject of Europe, Pecresse differs from Macron’s approach. Madame Pecresse takes the view that Europe should be more of an intergovernmental union, rather than a supranational body with powers that may be seen as interfering with France’s sovereignty. Macron on the other hand has continually pushed for more EU integration and even expressed support for federalising projects such as a European Army. For Macron, the goal is to supplement or supplant national military capabilities with a united European force. 

In security matters, Pecresse advocates for strengthening the French Army, as a part of NATO, rather than calling for a European Army. The manifesto asserts that the French navy is second only to the US, though the burgeoning Chinese navy would have a say in the matter. The inclusion of this language is to remind people of France’s global reach and that it is one of a few who can assert such power. In this view, France is seen as part of a quad of countries that dominate global affairs.

Pecresse, however, is explicit in the notion that France must utilize the EU to achieve its goals. The manifesto explicitly states: “The European Union: A Vehicle for Exerting our Power and Defending our Interests.” For instance, France is faced with large flows of migrants into its country from the Middle East and North Africa. Under Pecresse, France would lead the EU in recruiting 10,000 Frontex guards to help ease the flows, primarily out of the nation’s self-interest. The position has had some impact on the current President, who has begun pushing for more solidarity amongst EU members in defending the bloc’s borders, while suggesting there needs to be a plan to recruit more Frontex guards.

Utilising the EU’s magnifying power would not stop at immigration either. Another fundamental interest is to reassert influence in Africa and over la Francophonie. To do this, France would utilise the EU’s trade and economic levers while also directing the bloc’s aid budget into former colonies. Now that the UK is out of the EU, France’s former colonies can take precedence. This would also serve France’s global ambitions, as it attempts to respond to China’s growing influence in Africa, a region France sees crucial to maintaining its international stature.

Finally, Pecresse aims to maintain France’s globally capable military by investing in personnel training and the arms industry. Specifically, Pecresse would reinvest in shoring up France’s domestic ability to supply their armed forces, as she sees military equipment produced by other nations, including allies, as a threat to national security. In doing so, she would support the French economy while insulating the nation from supply chain threats, espionage and limiting the general influence of other countries over France’s armed forces. Investing in the military would allow French armed forces to continue their operations in North Africa while also inserting themselves into potential developments in Asia, where there are French territories.

Pecresse’s position on French interventionism is opposed to how Macron views France’s overseas operations. Recently, Macron has announced plans to draw down French forces in the Sahel, though not completely exiting the region. France has spent nearly a decade in the region and Macron sees the opportunity to shift the French strategic focus, exemplified by his actions and rhetoric towards the Pacific theatre and contributing to countering Chinese threats.

Overall, a Pecresse presidency would mean a more assertive France. It is telling that the quote used under the title of the election manifesto is from Charles de Gaulle. However, much of this depends on winning the election and potentially governing without a majority in the National Assembly.

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